a column by Neil Cummins for VOX: CEPR’s Policy Portal
Sharp declines in the concentration of declared wealth occurred across Europe and the US during the 20th century. But the rich may have been hiding much of their wealth.
This column introduces a new method to measure this hidden wealth, in any form. It finds that between 1920 and 1992, English elites concealed 20-32% of their wealth. Accounting for hidden wealth eliminates one-third of the observed decline of top 10% wealth share over the past century.
Continue reading
The column contains some really useful charts/graphs but I have not reproduced any of them in this very short introduction as I think you will need to read the surrounding text for them to make a lot of sense!
Hazel
Showing posts with label inequality. Show all posts
Showing posts with label inequality. Show all posts
Friday, 13 December 2019
Tuesday, 26 November 2019
Borrowed identities: Class(ification), inequality and the role of credit-debt in class making and struggle
an article by Matthew Sparkes (University of Cambridge, UK) published in The Sociological Review Volume 67 Issue: 6 (2019)
Abstract
Class analysis has re-emerged as a pertinent area of enquiry.
This development is linked to a growing body of work dubbed cultural class analysis, that utilises Bourdieu’s class scheme to develop rich understandings of how culture and lifestyle interacts with economic and social relations in Britain, generating inequalities and hierarchies. Yet cultural class analyses do not properly account for the way individuals resist their relative class positions, nor the role of unsecured credit in facilitating consumption.
This article contributes to this area by examining how unsecured credit and problem debt influences consumption and class position amongst individuals with modest incomes.
Drawing on 21 interviews with individuals managing problem debt, this article details how class inequality emerges through affective states that include anxiety and feelings of deficit. It also shows how these experiences motivate participants to rely on unsecured credit to consume cultural goods and engage in activities in a struggle against their class position, with the intention of enhancing how they are perceived and classified by others.
The findings indicate that cultural class analyses may have overlooked the symbolic importance of mundane consumption and goods in social differentiation.
This article further details how these processes entangle individuals into complex liens of debt – which lead to over-indebtedness, default, dispossession and financial expropriation – illustrating how investigations of credit-debt can better inform understandings of class inequality, exploitation and struggle.
Abstract
Class analysis has re-emerged as a pertinent area of enquiry.
This development is linked to a growing body of work dubbed cultural class analysis, that utilises Bourdieu’s class scheme to develop rich understandings of how culture and lifestyle interacts with economic and social relations in Britain, generating inequalities and hierarchies. Yet cultural class analyses do not properly account for the way individuals resist their relative class positions, nor the role of unsecured credit in facilitating consumption.
This article contributes to this area by examining how unsecured credit and problem debt influences consumption and class position amongst individuals with modest incomes.
Drawing on 21 interviews with individuals managing problem debt, this article details how class inequality emerges through affective states that include anxiety and feelings of deficit. It also shows how these experiences motivate participants to rely on unsecured credit to consume cultural goods and engage in activities in a struggle against their class position, with the intention of enhancing how they are perceived and classified by others.
The findings indicate that cultural class analyses may have overlooked the symbolic importance of mundane consumption and goods in social differentiation.
This article further details how these processes entangle individuals into complex liens of debt – which lead to over-indebtedness, default, dispossession and financial expropriation – illustrating how investigations of credit-debt can better inform understandings of class inequality, exploitation and struggle.
Friday, 15 November 2019
Solidarity Within and Across Workplaces: How Cross-Workplace Coordination Affects Earnings Inequality
an article by Nathan Wilmers (MIT Sloan School of Management, USA) published in RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences Volume 5 Issue 4 (September 2019)
Abstract
The post–World War II period of wage compression provides a strong contrast to the last forty years of rising inequality.
In this article, I argue that inequality was previously constrained by pay coordination that spanned multiple workplaces. Cross-workplace coordination practices range from multi-employer bargaining agreements to informal employer collusion.
To quantify the influence of these practices on inequality, I draw on establishment-level Bureau of Labor Statistics microdata from 1968 to 1977. Inequality between workplaces did not increase during the 1970s and inequality was lower among workers likely to be covered by cross-workplace coordination.
Unionization, large establishments, and pension provision reduced inequality across workplaces, not only among coworkers within workplaces. These findings indicate that cross-workplace coordination mitigated inequality during the postwar period of egalitarian economic growth.
Full text (PDF 26pp)
Hazel’s comment
Despite this research being based in the USA I believe that it is also relevant to the UK starting as it does by telling us that the inequality gap is growing with the rich getting richer.
Abstract
The post–World War II period of wage compression provides a strong contrast to the last forty years of rising inequality.
In this article, I argue that inequality was previously constrained by pay coordination that spanned multiple workplaces. Cross-workplace coordination practices range from multi-employer bargaining agreements to informal employer collusion.
To quantify the influence of these practices on inequality, I draw on establishment-level Bureau of Labor Statistics microdata from 1968 to 1977. Inequality between workplaces did not increase during the 1970s and inequality was lower among workers likely to be covered by cross-workplace coordination.
Unionization, large establishments, and pension provision reduced inequality across workplaces, not only among coworkers within workplaces. These findings indicate that cross-workplace coordination mitigated inequality during the postwar period of egalitarian economic growth.
Full text (PDF 26pp)
Hazel’s comment
Despite this research being based in the USA I believe that it is also relevant to the UK starting as it does by telling us that the inequality gap is growing with the rich getting richer.
Thursday, 14 November 2019
The war on rough sleeping: On the criminalization of homelessness in Hungary
an article by Vera Kovács published in Eurozine
Abstract
The criminalization of homelessness was written into the Hungarian constitution in 2018, which caused international uproar and condemnation by the UN. But punitive measures are not a speciality of the Orbán government. Many European countries have taken similar steps. But only Hungary has made a specific social situation – ‘habitually staying in a public space’ – a criminal offence punishable by jail. Though recent elections have shown some room for change, expectations remain low.
Continue reading
Abstract
The criminalization of homelessness was written into the Hungarian constitution in 2018, which caused international uproar and condemnation by the UN. But punitive measures are not a speciality of the Orbán government. Many European countries have taken similar steps. But only Hungary has made a specific social situation – ‘habitually staying in a public space’ – a criminal offence punishable by jail. Though recent elections have shown some room for change, expectations remain low.
Continue reading
Wednesday, 30 October 2019
Explaining the Neoliberal turn
a post from Transforming Society: a space where research evidence and critique can create positive social change
In this long read, Roger Brown, author of The Inequality Crisis: The Facts and What We Can Do About It, outlines causes of the Neoliberal turn and shows how it has created vastly increased and unjust social inequality. Crucially, he explains where we need to begin in order to reverse the tide.
In November 1984, at the age of 90, the former Prime Minister, the Earl of Stockton (previously, Mr Harold Macmillan), made his maiden speech in the House of Lords. Besides warning, somewhat presciently, about a growing division of comparative prosperity in the South and an ailing North and Midlands, he asked where the theories of monetarism had really come from:
“Was it America?” he inquired, “Or was it Tibet? It is quite true, many of your Lordships will remember it operating in the nursery. How do you treat a cold? One nanny said, “Feed a cold”; she was a neo-Keynesian. The other said “Starve a cold”; she was a monetarist.
For about thirty years after the end of the Second World War, the advanced economies of the West enjoyed unprecedented prosperity. There were big increases in growth and productivity; there was full or near-full employment; economic inequality fell; home ownership increased; there was a considerable degree of financial stability.
Since the mid-70s we have had much smaller increases in growth, productivity and investment; lower savings and higher debt; higher unemployment, with many leaving the workforce altogether; greater market concentration; greater inequality; falling social mobility; greater poverty; increased fraud and other forms of crime; reduced trust, especially in institutions; and recurrent financial crises. Even the growth in home-ownership has tailed off. Only on inflation has the performance of the major Western economies since the mid-1970s been better than before. So why did most Western countries abandon what, on nearly all economic and social criteria, was a successful model, in favour of one that has been so much less successful?
Continue reading
In this long read, Roger Brown, author of The Inequality Crisis: The Facts and What We Can Do About It, outlines causes of the Neoliberal turn and shows how it has created vastly increased and unjust social inequality. Crucially, he explains where we need to begin in order to reverse the tide.
In November 1984, at the age of 90, the former Prime Minister, the Earl of Stockton (previously, Mr Harold Macmillan), made his maiden speech in the House of Lords. Besides warning, somewhat presciently, about a growing division of comparative prosperity in the South and an ailing North and Midlands, he asked where the theories of monetarism had really come from:
“Was it America?” he inquired, “Or was it Tibet? It is quite true, many of your Lordships will remember it operating in the nursery. How do you treat a cold? One nanny said, “Feed a cold”; she was a neo-Keynesian. The other said “Starve a cold”; she was a monetarist.
For about thirty years after the end of the Second World War, the advanced economies of the West enjoyed unprecedented prosperity. There were big increases in growth and productivity; there was full or near-full employment; economic inequality fell; home ownership increased; there was a considerable degree of financial stability.
Since the mid-70s we have had much smaller increases in growth, productivity and investment; lower savings and higher debt; higher unemployment, with many leaving the workforce altogether; greater market concentration; greater inequality; falling social mobility; greater poverty; increased fraud and other forms of crime; reduced trust, especially in institutions; and recurrent financial crises. Even the growth in home-ownership has tailed off. Only on inflation has the performance of the major Western economies since the mid-1970s been better than before. So why did most Western countries abandon what, on nearly all economic and social criteria, was a successful model, in favour of one that has been so much less successful?
Continue reading
Tuesday, 22 October 2019
'The West' is, in fact, the world's biggest gated community
a post by Frank Jacobs for the Big Think blog
A review of the global "wall" that divides rich from poor.
A giant global wall separates the rich from the poor
A review of the global "wall" that divides rich from poor.
A giant global wall separates the rich from the poor
- Trump's border wall is only one puzzle piece of a global picture.
- Similar anxieties are raising similar border defenses elsewhere.
- This map shows how, as a result, "the West" is in fact one large gated community.
Thursday, 17 October 2019
The rich poop different: measuring inequality with sewage
a post by Cory Doctorow for Boing Boing
In Social, demographic, and economic correlates of food and chemical consumption measured by wastewater-based epidemiology, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, a group of researchers in Australia and Norway present their analysis of a 2016 Australian sewage census, which sampled 22 waste-water treatment facilities and looked for 42 biomarkers.
The findings reveal that inequality can be detected in sewage. Wealthy people's shit has biomarkers for digested fresh fruits and veggies and grains, as well as higher doses of caffeine.
The poorer you are, the more likely it is that your waste contains biomarkers for antidepressants, opioids, and meds for neuropathy and blood pressure.
Continue reading
In Social, demographic, and economic correlates of food and chemical consumption measured by wastewater-based epidemiology, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, a group of researchers in Australia and Norway present their analysis of a 2016 Australian sewage census, which sampled 22 waste-water treatment facilities and looked for 42 biomarkers.
The findings reveal that inequality can be detected in sewage. Wealthy people's shit has biomarkers for digested fresh fruits and veggies and grains, as well as higher doses of caffeine.
The poorer you are, the more likely it is that your waste contains biomarkers for antidepressants, opioids, and meds for neuropathy and blood pressure.
Continue reading
Friday, 11 October 2019
Unequal unions? A comparative decomposition of income inequality in the European Union and United States
an article by Stefano Filauro (European Commission, Belgium; Sapienza University of Rome, Italy) and Zachary Parolin (University of Antwerp, Belgium) published in Journal of European Social Policy Volume 29 Issue 4 (October 2019)
Abstract
This study applies improved household income data to measure and decompose trends in pan-European income inequality from 2006 to 2014. To contrast the relative significance of economic homogeneity versus the efficacy of welfare state and labour market institutions in shaping income distributions, we compare the structure of inequality in the 28 Member States of the European Union (EU-28) to that of the 50 United States.
This comparison stands in contrast to the standard practice of evaluating the United States against individual EU Member States.
Despite the greater relative heterogeneity of the EU-28 and our corrections for the under-reporting of household income in the United States, post-fisc income inequality in the EU-28 remains lower than that of the United States from 2006 onward. Moreover, inequality appears to be rising in the United States, while it has remained stagnant since 2008 in the EU-28. In both unions, and particularly the United States, within-state income differences contribute more to union-wide inequality than between-state differences.
In a counterfactual analysis, we find that if the EU-28 matched the between-state homogeneity of the United States, but maintained its relative within-country inequalities, pan-European inequality would fall by only 20 percent.
Conversely, inequality in the United States would fall by 34 percent if it matched the within-country inequality of the EU-28.
Our findings suggest that the strengthening of egalitarian institutions within the 28 Member States is more consequential than economic convergence in reducing pan-European income inequality. We highlight institutional challenges towards achieving a ‘more equal’ Europe and discuss implications for future EU policy-making.
Abstract
This study applies improved household income data to measure and decompose trends in pan-European income inequality from 2006 to 2014. To contrast the relative significance of economic homogeneity versus the efficacy of welfare state and labour market institutions in shaping income distributions, we compare the structure of inequality in the 28 Member States of the European Union (EU-28) to that of the 50 United States.
This comparison stands in contrast to the standard practice of evaluating the United States against individual EU Member States.
Despite the greater relative heterogeneity of the EU-28 and our corrections for the under-reporting of household income in the United States, post-fisc income inequality in the EU-28 remains lower than that of the United States from 2006 onward. Moreover, inequality appears to be rising in the United States, while it has remained stagnant since 2008 in the EU-28. In both unions, and particularly the United States, within-state income differences contribute more to union-wide inequality than between-state differences.
In a counterfactual analysis, we find that if the EU-28 matched the between-state homogeneity of the United States, but maintained its relative within-country inequalities, pan-European inequality would fall by only 20 percent.
Conversely, inequality in the United States would fall by 34 percent if it matched the within-country inequality of the EU-28.
Our findings suggest that the strengthening of egalitarian institutions within the 28 Member States is more consequential than economic convergence in reducing pan-European income inequality. We highlight institutional challenges towards achieving a ‘more equal’ Europe and discuss implications for future EU policy-making.
Tuesday, 8 October 2019
Support for conditional unemployment benefit in European countries: The role of income inequality
an article by Renzo Carriero and Marianna Filandri (University of Turin, Italy) published in Journal of European Social Policy Volume 29 Issue 4 (October 2019)
Abstract
This article investigates attitudes towards the conditionality of benefits targeted to a specific needy group, the unemployed, and analyses their relationship with the structure of income inequality. The focus is on the deservingness of welfare recipients.
The public seems to use five criteria to define deservingness and, consequently, the conditionality to which public support is subjected:
Specifically, we focus on different measures of the structure of income inequality which are indicators of the social distance between welfare recipients and taxpayers. Based on data from three waves of the European Values Study (1990–2008) collected in
30 countries, the study offers a comparative and longitudinal analysis. The picture emerging from the within-country analysis – which removed much of the between-country heterogeneity − shows that when the social distance grows, it is more difficult for the majority of citizens (upper and middle classes) to identify with the unemployed.
Abstract
This article investigates attitudes towards the conditionality of benefits targeted to a specific needy group, the unemployed, and analyses their relationship with the structure of income inequality. The focus is on the deservingness of welfare recipients.
The public seems to use five criteria to define deservingness and, consequently, the conditionality to which public support is subjected:
- need,
- attitude (i.e. gratefulness),
- control (over neediness),
- reciprocity (of giving and receiving) and
- identity, that is the similarity or proximity between the providers of public support (the taxpayers) and the people who should receive it. People’s willingness to help depends on how close they consider benefit recipients to be to themselves (i.e. the extent to which they belong to the same in-group).
Specifically, we focus on different measures of the structure of income inequality which are indicators of the social distance between welfare recipients and taxpayers. Based on data from three waves of the European Values Study (1990–2008) collected in
30 countries, the study offers a comparative and longitudinal analysis. The picture emerging from the within-country analysis – which removed much of the between-country heterogeneity − shows that when the social distance grows, it is more difficult for the majority of citizens (upper and middle classes) to identify with the unemployed.
Saturday, 5 October 2019
We cannot build our way out of inequality
a column by Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Michael Storper for VOX: CEPR’s Policy Portal
A dominant view in urban economics suggests that the solution to the housing crisis of major cities is to relax zoning and other planning regulations.
This column challenges this position, arguing that there is no clear and uncontroversial evidence that housing regulation is a principal source of differences in home availability or prices across cities and that these issues are more linked to rising inequalities in the geography of employment, wages and skills.
Blanket changes in zoning are unlikely to increase affordability for lower-income households in prosperous regions, but would increase gentrification without appreciably decreasing income inequality.
Continue reading
A dominant view in urban economics suggests that the solution to the housing crisis of major cities is to relax zoning and other planning regulations.
This column challenges this position, arguing that there is no clear and uncontroversial evidence that housing regulation is a principal source of differences in home availability or prices across cities and that these issues are more linked to rising inequalities in the geography of employment, wages and skills.
Blanket changes in zoning are unlikely to increase affordability for lower-income households in prosperous regions, but would increase gentrification without appreciably decreasing income inequality.
Continue reading
Tuesday, 1 October 2019
Driving the superstar economy: Skilled tradable services
a column by Fabian Eckert, Sharat Ganapati and Conor Walsh for VOX: CEPR’s Policy Portal
In recent years, wages for highly skilled workers have grown rapidly.
Using US data between 1980 and 2015, this column studies a group of service industries that are skill-intensive, widely traded, and have recently seen explosive wage growth. It shows that, unlike any other sector, the wage growth in these industries was strongly biased toward the densest local labour markets and the highest-paying firms.
These developments alone explain 30% of the increase in inequality between the 50th and 90th percentiles of the wage distribution.
Continue reading
In recent years, wages for highly skilled workers have grown rapidly.
Using US data between 1980 and 2015, this column studies a group of service industries that are skill-intensive, widely traded, and have recently seen explosive wage growth. It shows that, unlike any other sector, the wage growth in these industries was strongly biased toward the densest local labour markets and the highest-paying firms.
These developments alone explain 30% of the increase in inequality between the 50th and 90th percentiles of the wage distribution.
Continue reading
Monday, 30 September 2019
The cultural policy puzzle
Dave O’Brien (University of Edinburgh, UK) published in IPPR Progressive Review Volume 26 Issue 2 (Autumn 2019)
Abstract
Is cultural policy a problem or a solution for social inequality?
Full text (PDF 10pp)
In view of the shortness of the abstract, and to save you reading the whole article, here are some of the highlights.
“cultural policy can be both the least and the most important area of government. Yet it remains neglected”
“two sets of problems for cultural policy: inequalities that are within the cultural sector; and the impact of culture on social inequalities more generally”
“the impact of culture on criminal justice, education, urban regeneration and health has not been fully embraced by government”
“much more detailed and strategic thinking is needed to change the relationship between cultural organisations and sections of the public”
“The cultural sector has to take responsibility for its role in the continued exclusions of those who do not replicate the white, middle‐class standard that dominates the cultural sector”
Abstract
Is cultural policy a problem or a solution for social inequality?
Full text (PDF 10pp)
In view of the shortness of the abstract, and to save you reading the whole article, here are some of the highlights.
“cultural policy can be both the least and the most important area of government. Yet it remains neglected”
“two sets of problems for cultural policy: inequalities that are within the cultural sector; and the impact of culture on social inequalities more generally”
“the impact of culture on criminal justice, education, urban regeneration and health has not been fully embraced by government”
“much more detailed and strategic thinking is needed to change the relationship between cultural organisations and sections of the public”
“The cultural sector has to take responsibility for its role in the continued exclusions of those who do not replicate the white, middle‐class standard that dominates the cultural sector”
Thursday, 12 September 2019
The Drivers of Income Inequality in Rich Countries
an article by Brian Nolan and Luis Valenzuela (University of Oxford, UK) and Matteo G. Richiardi (University of Essex, UK) published in Journal of Economic Surveys Volume 34 Issue 4 (September 2019)
Abstract
Rising income inequality has recently come centre‐stage as a core societal concern for rich countries.
The diagnosis of the forces driving inequality upwards and their relative importance remain hotly contested, notably with respect to the roles of globalization versus technology and of market forces versus institutions and policy choices.
This survey provides a critical review and synthesis of recent research.
The focus is on income inequality across the entire distribution, rather than only on what has been happening at the very top. We pay particular attention to include what has been learned from the analysis of micro‐data, to ensure that the coverage is not unduly US‐centric and to analyses of the interrelations between the different drivers of inequality.
The marked differences in inequality trends across countries and time periods reflect how global economic forces such as globalization and technological change have interacted with differing national contexts and institutions. Major analytical challenges stand in the way of a consensus emerging on the relative importance of different drivers in how income inequality has evolved in recent decades.
Abstract
Rising income inequality has recently come centre‐stage as a core societal concern for rich countries.
The diagnosis of the forces driving inequality upwards and their relative importance remain hotly contested, notably with respect to the roles of globalization versus technology and of market forces versus institutions and policy choices.
This survey provides a critical review and synthesis of recent research.
The focus is on income inequality across the entire distribution, rather than only on what has been happening at the very top. We pay particular attention to include what has been learned from the analysis of micro‐data, to ensure that the coverage is not unduly US‐centric and to analyses of the interrelations between the different drivers of inequality.
The marked differences in inequality trends across countries and time periods reflect how global economic forces such as globalization and technological change have interacted with differing national contexts and institutions. Major analytical challenges stand in the way of a consensus emerging on the relative importance of different drivers in how income inequality has evolved in recent decades.
Friday, 6 September 2019
If Mass Poverty Is Declining, Why Should We Worry About High Inequality?
an article by Pranab Bardhan published in 3 Quarks Daily
There is widespread concern about increasing or high economic inequality in many countries, both rich and poor. At a global level, according to the World Inequality Report 2018, the richest 1% in the world reaped 27% of the growth in world income between 1980 and 2016, while bottom 50% of the population got only 12%. Over roughly the same period, however, absolute poverty by standard measures has generally been on the decline in most countries. By the widely-used World Bank estimates, in 2015 only about 10 per cent of the world population lived below its common, admittedly rather austere, poverty line of $1.90 per capita per day (at 2011 purchasing power parity), compared to 36 per cent in 1990. This decline is by and large valid even if one uses broader measures of poverty that take into account some non-income indicators (like deprivations in health and education) for the countries for which such data are available.
If absolute poverty is declining, while measures of relative inequality (of income or wealth) show a significant rise (or remain very high), this implies that the conditions of the poor may be improving, but those for the rich may be improving much more. But if people are less poor than before, should we be concerned about high or rising inequality, about how much better-off the rich are, and, if so, why? This is an important question on which more clarity is needed, as quite often when people tell you why they dislike inequality many of the examples they cite are really about their aversion to the stark poverty around them.
Continue reading
There is widespread concern about increasing or high economic inequality in many countries, both rich and poor. At a global level, according to the World Inequality Report 2018, the richest 1% in the world reaped 27% of the growth in world income between 1980 and 2016, while bottom 50% of the population got only 12%. Over roughly the same period, however, absolute poverty by standard measures has generally been on the decline in most countries. By the widely-used World Bank estimates, in 2015 only about 10 per cent of the world population lived below its common, admittedly rather austere, poverty line of $1.90 per capita per day (at 2011 purchasing power parity), compared to 36 per cent in 1990. This decline is by and large valid even if one uses broader measures of poverty that take into account some non-income indicators (like deprivations in health and education) for the countries for which such data are available.
If absolute poverty is declining, while measures of relative inequality (of income or wealth) show a significant rise (or remain very high), this implies that the conditions of the poor may be improving, but those for the rich may be improving much more. But if people are less poor than before, should we be concerned about high or rising inequality, about how much better-off the rich are, and, if so, why? This is an important question on which more clarity is needed, as quite often when people tell you why they dislike inequality many of the examples they cite are really about their aversion to the stark poverty around them.
Continue reading
Friday, 30 August 2019
Detecting Historical Inequality Patterns: A Replication of Thomas Piketty's Wealth Concentration Estimates for the United Kingdom
an article by Phillip W. Magness (American Institute for Economic Research) published in Social Science Quarterly Volume 100 Issue 5 (August 2019)
Abstract
Objective
This article utilizes a replication exercise to evaluate the reliability of the historical time series for top wealth share concentrations in the United Kingdom, as presented in Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty‐First Century (2014a).
Method
Using Piketty's identified source records, an attempt is made to replicate the construction of his time series for top wealth concentrations in the U.K. These results are then compared against the series presented in Capital, and subsequent improvements by other scholars.
Results
Piketty's time series is shown to diverge substantially from its source data from the U.K., and does not appear to be replicable. In particular, Piketty's series introduces a sizable post‐1980 adjustment that suggests a substantially more rapid acceleration of wealth concentration than its source statistics reveal. Issues of reliability in the U.K. time series mirror similar problems with Piketty's wealth estimates for the United States, although their implications for historical interpretation differ in light of subsequent data.
Conclusion
These findings indicate that Piketty's account of changing wealth concentrations in the United Kingdom in the 20th century is unreliable for interpreting recent patterns in the evolution of top wealth shares. An alternative interpretation of the source data is therefore offered, pointing to a century‐long L‐shaped pattern in place of Piketty's depicted U‐curve.
JEL Classification: N14, D63
Abstract
Objective
This article utilizes a replication exercise to evaluate the reliability of the historical time series for top wealth share concentrations in the United Kingdom, as presented in Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty‐First Century (2014a).
Method
Using Piketty's identified source records, an attempt is made to replicate the construction of his time series for top wealth concentrations in the U.K. These results are then compared against the series presented in Capital, and subsequent improvements by other scholars.
Results
Piketty's time series is shown to diverge substantially from its source data from the U.K., and does not appear to be replicable. In particular, Piketty's series introduces a sizable post‐1980 adjustment that suggests a substantially more rapid acceleration of wealth concentration than its source statistics reveal. Issues of reliability in the U.K. time series mirror similar problems with Piketty's wealth estimates for the United States, although their implications for historical interpretation differ in light of subsequent data.
Conclusion
These findings indicate that Piketty's account of changing wealth concentrations in the United Kingdom in the 20th century is unreliable for interpreting recent patterns in the evolution of top wealth shares. An alternative interpretation of the source data is therefore offered, pointing to a century‐long L‐shaped pattern in place of Piketty's depicted U‐curve.
JEL Classification: N14, D63
Thursday, 29 August 2019
Visible and invisible borders in time and space
an article by Geraldine Healy (Queen Mary University of London, London, UK) published in Equality, Diversity and Inclusion Volume 38 Issue 6 (2019)
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explore how biography influences professional and academic development. It aims to show how in different ways our experiences reflect the structures of society and that histories repeat themselves with different protagonists and different preys. It uses the author’s own biography to argue that in the author’s case, early influences of Irish migration shaped some of the decisions she made and her commitment to researching inequalities. The paper also asks how relevant are early life influences on the careers of equality and diversity academics?
Design/methodology/approach
This paper uses a biographical method that draws on a personal history of migration and relates these to historical moments to show the interconnection between the self and wider macro events.
Findings
The findings of the paper show the relevance and interconnection of biography with the macro and political context. The paper explores how an academic's personal biography[1] and the multi-layered relationship between the self and the wider macro historical context have influenced her research development. It does this by using her personal stories of being part of an Irish community and shows how everyday interactions may lead to a sense of being an outsider, of being other. History is used to show the multiple borders that Irish and other migrants experience, from biographic and diasporic borders, to violence and conflict and finally to work borders including the link with the author's research work. The paper argues that while the targets of discrimination may change over time, contemporary events can intensify the devaluation and othering of particular migrant groups.
Originality/value
Each biography has a unique element but the paper shows how individual biographies are connected and interrelated with the macro level of analysis.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explore how biography influences professional and academic development. It aims to show how in different ways our experiences reflect the structures of society and that histories repeat themselves with different protagonists and different preys. It uses the author’s own biography to argue that in the author’s case, early influences of Irish migration shaped some of the decisions she made and her commitment to researching inequalities. The paper also asks how relevant are early life influences on the careers of equality and diversity academics?
Design/methodology/approach
This paper uses a biographical method that draws on a personal history of migration and relates these to historical moments to show the interconnection between the self and wider macro events.
Findings
The findings of the paper show the relevance and interconnection of biography with the macro and political context. The paper explores how an academic's personal biography[1] and the multi-layered relationship between the self and the wider macro historical context have influenced her research development. It does this by using her personal stories of being part of an Irish community and shows how everyday interactions may lead to a sense of being an outsider, of being other. History is used to show the multiple borders that Irish and other migrants experience, from biographic and diasporic borders, to violence and conflict and finally to work borders including the link with the author's research work. The paper argues that while the targets of discrimination may change over time, contemporary events can intensify the devaluation and othering of particular migrant groups.
Originality/value
Each biography has a unique element but the paper shows how individual biographies are connected and interrelated with the macro level of analysis.
Friday, 23 August 2019
Measuring Welfare Beyond GDP
an article by Andrew Aitken (National Institute of Economic and Social Research; Economic Statistics Centre of Excellence (ESCoE)) published in National Institute Economic Review Volume 249 Issue 1 (August 2019)
Abstract
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is often treated as shorthand for national economic well-being, even though it was never intended to be; it is a measure of (some) of the marketable output of the economy.
This paper reviews several developments in measuring welfare beyond GDP that were recently presented at the Economic Statistics Centre of Excellence (ESCoE) annual conference in May 2019.
The papers discussed fall into three broad areas.
First, a significant amount of work has focused on incorporating information about the distribution of income, consumption and wealth in the national accounts.
Second, the effects of digitisation and the growth of the internet highlight the potential value in measuring time use as a measure of welfare.
Third, the digital revolution has spawned many new, often ‘free’ goods, the welfare consequences of which are difficult to measure. Other areas, such as government services, are also difficult to measure.
Measuring economic welfare properly matters because it affects the decisions made by government and society. GDP does a reasonable job of measuring the marketable output of the economy (which remains important for some policies), but it should be downgraded; more attention should be given to measures that reflect both objective and subjective measures of well-being, and measures that better reflect the heterogeneity of peoples' experiences.
JEL classification: I31, D31, E01
Full text (PDF 14pp)
Abstract
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is often treated as shorthand for national economic well-being, even though it was never intended to be; it is a measure of (some) of the marketable output of the economy.
This paper reviews several developments in measuring welfare beyond GDP that were recently presented at the Economic Statistics Centre of Excellence (ESCoE) annual conference in May 2019.
The papers discussed fall into three broad areas.
First, a significant amount of work has focused on incorporating information about the distribution of income, consumption and wealth in the national accounts.
Second, the effects of digitisation and the growth of the internet highlight the potential value in measuring time use as a measure of welfare.
Third, the digital revolution has spawned many new, often ‘free’ goods, the welfare consequences of which are difficult to measure. Other areas, such as government services, are also difficult to measure.
Measuring economic welfare properly matters because it affects the decisions made by government and society. GDP does a reasonable job of measuring the marketable output of the economy (which remains important for some policies), but it should be downgraded; more attention should be given to measures that reflect both objective and subjective measures of well-being, and measures that better reflect the heterogeneity of peoples' experiences.
JEL classification: I31, D31, E01
Full text (PDF 14pp)
Friday, 19 July 2019
Poverty reduction and democratization – new cross-country evidence
an article by Frank-Borge Wietzke (Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals, Spain) published in Democratization Volume 26 Issue 6 (2019)
Abstract
The rapid decrease in absolute poverty across the developing world has received much attention. However, there have been few systematic attempts to analyse the political consequences of these developments.
This article builds on the improved availability of household income data from developing countries to document a small but statistically significant impact of lagged poverty rates on a range of democracy indicators. The results hold across a battery of sensitivity and robustness tests.
I also show that poverty reduction has a stronger effect on democracy than alternative predictors that are more widely used in the democratic regime transition and consolidation literature, such as average income and relative inequality (the Gini index). However, I find weaker effects of poverty on indicators of government quality and a declining influence of poverty reduction on democracy over time.
These results point to more structural obstacles to democratic consolidation in lower-income regions, such as a tendency by populist leaders to exploit the economic grievances of vulnerable lower-middle classes.
Full text (PDF 25pp)
Abstract
The rapid decrease in absolute poverty across the developing world has received much attention. However, there have been few systematic attempts to analyse the political consequences of these developments.
This article builds on the improved availability of household income data from developing countries to document a small but statistically significant impact of lagged poverty rates on a range of democracy indicators. The results hold across a battery of sensitivity and robustness tests.
I also show that poverty reduction has a stronger effect on democracy than alternative predictors that are more widely used in the democratic regime transition and consolidation literature, such as average income and relative inequality (the Gini index). However, I find weaker effects of poverty on indicators of government quality and a declining influence of poverty reduction on democracy over time.
These results point to more structural obstacles to democratic consolidation in lower-income regions, such as a tendency by populist leaders to exploit the economic grievances of vulnerable lower-middle classes.
Full text (PDF 25pp)
Thursday, 18 July 2019
The economic geography of sovereignist Europe
a column by Gianmarco Ottaviano for VOX: CEPR’s Policy Portal
Economic geography strikes back. After a couple of decades of easy talk about the ‘death of distance’ in the age of globalisation, the promise of a world of rising living standards for all is increasingly challenged by the resilience of regional disparities within countries. As long as many people and firms are not geographically mobile – and those who are tend to be the most skilled and productive – easier distant interactions can actually strengthen rather than weaken agglomeration economies. Recent electoral trends in Europe can be understood to a surprisingly large extent from this angle.
Continue reading
Economic geography strikes back. After a couple of decades of easy talk about the ‘death of distance’ in the age of globalisation, the promise of a world of rising living standards for all is increasingly challenged by the resilience of regional disparities within countries. As long as many people and firms are not geographically mobile – and those who are tend to be the most skilled and productive – easier distant interactions can actually strengthen rather than weaken agglomeration economies. Recent electoral trends in Europe can be understood to a surprisingly large extent from this angle.
Continue reading
Thursday, 20 June 2019
Human development in the age of globalisation
a column by Leandro de la Escosura for VOX: CEPR’s Policy Portal
The concept of human development views wellbeing as being affected by a wide range of factors including health and education.
This column examines worldwide long-term wellbeing from 1870-2015 with an augmented historical human development index (AHHDI) that combines new measures of achievements in health, education, material living standards, and political freedom. It shows that world human development has steadily improved over time, although advances have been unevenly distributed across world regions.
Continue reading
And if, like me, you enjoy reading social history you will really like this piece.
The concept of human development views wellbeing as being affected by a wide range of factors including health and education.
This column examines worldwide long-term wellbeing from 1870-2015 with an augmented historical human development index (AHHDI) that combines new measures of achievements in health, education, material living standards, and political freedom. It shows that world human development has steadily improved over time, although advances have been unevenly distributed across world regions.
Continue reading
And if, like me, you enjoy reading social history you will really like this piece.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
