an article by Joseph H. Michalski (King’s University College at Western University, Canada) published in The British Journal of Sociology Volume 70 Issue 5 (December 2019)
Abstract
The current paper examines terrorism as a special form of moralistic violence, with several key features that distinguish such behaviour from other types of violence.
The theory of lethal moralism highlights the importance of social polarisation, characterised by vast differences in social space and inequality between adversaries as crucial to explaining deadly terrorist attacks.
Where the differences are more permanent or chronic – and the groups in question define and justify their existence specifically in contradistinction to ‘other’ groups – then the polarisation intensifies and attacks tend to be more lethal. In contrast, groups that appeal to broader audiences or the general public as potential allies more often use non‐lethal terrorism to their strategic advantage.
The study examines the United States and the United Kingdom to classify each of more than 8,000 attacks between 1970 and 2017 in terms of their ideological orientations. The evidence highlights the arc of terrorism in relation to different types of groups, as well as confirms the more lethal nature of terrorism linked especially to radical Islam, right‐wing religious extremists, hate groups, ethno‐nationalist sectarian violence, and anti‐government anarchists.
Yet apart from the extensive use of terrorism associated with ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, the majority of terrorist attacks in the US and the UK have not produced deaths.
Most terrorism instead has been perpetrated by groups aiming to rally support for a general cause and has been far less deadly on balance. The implications of these findings are discussed with a view toward developing more powerful explanatory models that focus on the socio‐cultural contexts and justification frameworks that inspire extremism and the use of lethal moralism to settle disputes.
Showing posts with label terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label terrorism. Show all posts
Thursday, 19 December 2019
Thursday, 1 February 2018
Terrorism, Trust and Tourism
an article by Susanne Jensen (Idea2action, Hobro, Denmark) and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen (Aarhus University, Denmark) published in Issues in Social Science Volume 5 Number 2 2017
Abstract
How does terrorism affect social trust and tourism?
The rising number of terrorist attacks in Western Europe has caused safety problems not only for local citizens but also for tourists. In fact, terrorists challenge the formal violence monopoly of the state thus creating a sense of anarchy and distrust.
Social trust is about trusting strangers, so when less predictable behaviour occurs in, a given country, people become more careful as they tend to trust most other people less.
An interesting case for future research is Scandinavia as the level of terrorism is still low and, at the same time, Scandinavia can record most social trust in the world meaning a competitive advantage when attracting tourists. Arguably, a double dividend is created from fighting terrorism, namely more social trust accumulated and more tourists attracted.
Future research should therefore try to further test our model by both quantitative and qualitative methods, for example by undertaking extensive comparative studies between Scandinavia and other countries with more terrorism and less trust.
Full text (PDF 9pp)
Abstract
How does terrorism affect social trust and tourism?
The rising number of terrorist attacks in Western Europe has caused safety problems not only for local citizens but also for tourists. In fact, terrorists challenge the formal violence monopoly of the state thus creating a sense of anarchy and distrust.
Social trust is about trusting strangers, so when less predictable behaviour occurs in, a given country, people become more careful as they tend to trust most other people less.
An interesting case for future research is Scandinavia as the level of terrorism is still low and, at the same time, Scandinavia can record most social trust in the world meaning a competitive advantage when attracting tourists. Arguably, a double dividend is created from fighting terrorism, namely more social trust accumulated and more tourists attracted.
Future research should therefore try to further test our model by both quantitative and qualitative methods, for example by undertaking extensive comparative studies between Scandinavia and other countries with more terrorism and less trust.
Full text (PDF 9pp)
Wednesday, 15 November 2017
100,000 false positives for every real terrorist: Why anti-terror algorithms don't work
an article by Timme Bisgaard Munk (University of Copenhagen, Denmark) published in First Monday Volume 22 Number 9 (September 2017)
Abstract
Can terrorist attacks be predicted and prevented using classification algorithms? Can predictive analytics see the hidden patterns and data tracks in the planning of terrorist acts?
According to a number of IT firms that now offer programs to predict terrorism using predictive analytics, the answer is yes. According to scientific and application-oriented literature, however, these programs raise a number of practical, statistical and recursive problems. In a literature review and discussion, this paper examines specific problems involved in predicting terrorism.
The problems include the opportunity cost of false positives/false negatives, the statistical quality of the prediction and the self-reinforcing, corrupting recursive effects of predictive analytics, since the method lacks an inner meta-model for its own learning- and pattern-dependent adaptation.
The conclusion is algorithms don’t work for detecting terrorism and is ineffective, risky and inappropriate, with potentially 100,000 false positives for every real terrorist that the algorithm finds.
Full Text (HTML)
Abstract
Can terrorist attacks be predicted and prevented using classification algorithms? Can predictive analytics see the hidden patterns and data tracks in the planning of terrorist acts?
According to a number of IT firms that now offer programs to predict terrorism using predictive analytics, the answer is yes. According to scientific and application-oriented literature, however, these programs raise a number of practical, statistical and recursive problems. In a literature review and discussion, this paper examines specific problems involved in predicting terrorism.
The problems include the opportunity cost of false positives/false negatives, the statistical quality of the prediction and the self-reinforcing, corrupting recursive effects of predictive analytics, since the method lacks an inner meta-model for its own learning- and pattern-dependent adaptation.
The conclusion is algorithms don’t work for detecting terrorism and is ineffective, risky and inappropriate, with potentially 100,000 false positives for every real terrorist that the algorithm finds.
Full Text (HTML)
Saturday, 7 October 2017
It’s Not Islam That Drives Young Europeans to Jihad, France’s Top Terrorism Expert Explains
3 Quarks Daily commented on, and linked to, a report in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz by Davide Lerner. I can’t bring you the original report as the online version of Haaretz is riddled with adverts which are hard to get beyond and some are definitely, in my opinion, in the “not safe for work” category.
However, here is what 3 Quarks had to say:
Salman Abedi, the suicide bomber who killed 22 people at a Manchester pop concert this week, started life advantageously enough: to parents who had fled Gadhafi’s Libya for a new life in Britain. But actually it was that kind of dislocation that would send him off kilter two decades later, says Olivier Roy, one of France’s top experts on Islamic terrorism.
“An estimated 60 percent of those who espouse violent jihadism in Europe are second-generation Muslims who have lost their connection with their country of origin and have failed to integrate into Western societies,” Roy says.
They are subject to a “process of deculturation” that leaves them ignorant of and detached from both the European society and the one of their origins. The result, Roy argues, is a dangerous “identity vacuum” in which “violent extremism thrives.”
However, here is what 3 Quarks had to say:
Salman Abedi, the suicide bomber who killed 22 people at a Manchester pop concert this week, started life advantageously enough: to parents who had fled Gadhafi’s Libya for a new life in Britain. But actually it was that kind of dislocation that would send him off kilter two decades later, says Olivier Roy, one of France’s top experts on Islamic terrorism.
“An estimated 60 percent of those who espouse violent jihadism in Europe are second-generation Muslims who have lost their connection with their country of origin and have failed to integrate into Western societies,” Roy says.
They are subject to a “process of deculturation” that leaves them ignorant of and detached from both the European society and the one of their origins. The result, Roy argues, is a dangerous “identity vacuum” in which “violent extremism thrives.”
Friday, 3 February 2017
The mimetic virus: a vector for cyber-terrorism
an article by Nicholas Ayres, Leandros A. Maglaras, Helge Janicke, Richard Smith and Ying He (School of Computer Science and Informatics, De Montfort University, Leicester, UK) published in International Journal of Business Continuity and Risk Management Volume 6 Number 4 (2016)
Abstract
Like conventional terrorism, cyber-terrorism has the same aims and goals but the act is done exclusively within cyberspace where the computer is both weapon and target.
Unlike conventional terrorism, cyber-terrorism is not analogue but digital and any potential attack could have global consequences. Current thinking is that critical national infrastructure (CNI) is the main target of focus for cyber-terrorism but with so many people online on a national or even global scale, public could prove to be an easier, more tempting target.
This article addresses how the cyber-terrorist could use the public as target of a real or fake attack by using a mimetic virus as the weapon.
Hazel’s comment:
I wish I had access to the article but …
Abstract
Like conventional terrorism, cyber-terrorism has the same aims and goals but the act is done exclusively within cyberspace where the computer is both weapon and target.
Unlike conventional terrorism, cyber-terrorism is not analogue but digital and any potential attack could have global consequences. Current thinking is that critical national infrastructure (CNI) is the main target of focus for cyber-terrorism but with so many people online on a national or even global scale, public could prove to be an easier, more tempting target.
This article addresses how the cyber-terrorist could use the public as target of a real or fake attack by using a mimetic virus as the weapon.
Hazel’s comment:
I wish I had access to the article but …
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