a column by Yi Huang, Ugo Panizza and Richard Varghese for VOX: CEPR’s Policy Portal
Establishing the presence of a causal link from public debt to economic growth and investment has proved challenging.
This column uses data for nearly 550,000 firms in 69 countries to show that government debt affects corporate investment by tightening the credit constraints faced by private firms. Higher levels of public debt increase the correlation between investment and cashflow for firms that are more likely to be credit constrained – i.e. unlisted, small, and young firms – but appear to have no effect on the correlation between cash and investment of listed, well-established, and large firms.
Continue reading
Showing posts with label credit_constraints. Show all posts
Showing posts with label credit_constraints. Show all posts
Wednesday, 11 December 2019
Friday, 12 October 2012
The Higher Education White Paper: The Good, the Bad, the Unspeakable – and the Next White Paper
an article by Nicholas Barr (London School of Economics and Political Science) published in Social Policy & Administration Volume 46 Issue 5 (October 2012)
Abstract
This article argues that reforms of higher education finance for undergraduates in England introduced by the Blair government in 2006 provided a progressive strategy for achieving the central objectives of higher education of quality (better), access (wider) and size (larger).
Reforms in 2012 are a not a strategy but a collection of ad hoc arrangements. They include the good (a higher fees cap, a higher interest rate on student loans, better information and improved support for part-time study), the bad (abolishing most taxpayer support for teaching in the arts and humanities and the social sciences, and raising excessively the threshold at which loan repayments start) and the unspeakable (abolishing Education Maintenance Allowances and AimHigher).
The reforms are fiscally costly and hence perpetuate the central problem of capped student numbers, and will not stand the test of time.
The concluding section outlines the next White Paper.
Abstract
This article argues that reforms of higher education finance for undergraduates in England introduced by the Blair government in 2006 provided a progressive strategy for achieving the central objectives of higher education of quality (better), access (wider) and size (larger).
Reforms in 2012 are a not a strategy but a collection of ad hoc arrangements. They include the good (a higher fees cap, a higher interest rate on student loans, better information and improved support for part-time study), the bad (abolishing most taxpayer support for teaching in the arts and humanities and the social sciences, and raising excessively the threshold at which loan repayments start) and the unspeakable (abolishing Education Maintenance Allowances and AimHigher).
The reforms are fiscally costly and hence perpetuate the central problem of capped student numbers, and will not stand the test of time.
The concluding section outlines the next White Paper.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
