an article by Tine Ustad Figenschou (Oslo Metropolitan University, Norway), Rune Karlsen
Kristoffer Kolltveit (University of Oslo, Norway) and Thomas Schillemans (Utrecht University, The Netherlands) published in European Journal of Communication Volume 34 Issue 4 (August 2019)
Abstract
Decision-making in public bureaucracies should be guided by rules and formal procedures, securing predictability, impartiality and fair decisions. Studies show that public bureaucracies are highly mediatised – but knowledge about media impact on political outcomes is scarce.
In this article, we study if, how and why media affect agendas, resource allocation and case decisions within public bureaucracies.
Empirically, we apply a mixed method approach to the case of Norway, utilising a comprehensive survey among civil servants in ministries and agencies, as well as in-depth interviews with civil servants and political leaders. The results clearly support the notion that media can influence agendas, resource allocation and decision-making in ministries and agencies.
When media pressure and broad public support build up, action is particularly taken when the issues are deemed important by political actors, suggesting that both push and pull forces are involved when media influence public bureaucracies.
Hazel’s comment
Many years ago I was working on an innovative technological project and one member of the team had the job of scouring the newspapers for mention of what we were doing and sometimes changes were made as a result.
This is not a new phenomenon but “the media” is a very different animal today from 30 years ago.
Showing posts with label civil_servants. Show all posts
Showing posts with label civil_servants. Show all posts
Monday, 19 August 2019
Thursday, 25 July 2019
The demand for advice at the European Union level: policy advice politicization in the European Commission
an article by Anastasia Rogacheva (Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore) published in Policy Studies Volume 40 Issue 3-4 (2019)
Abstract
The study focuses on the role of policy advice brokers – political advisors – pertaining to the issue of politicization in the European Commission (EC). The study conceptualizes politicization as increased use of political advisors – known as “cabinets” in the EC context – by the Commissioners to ensure political direction over the work of the civil service.
Commissioners’ private cabinets fulfil several functions, one of which is political steering of the policy work in the departments.
The study argues that as a result of the NPM-style reform and strengthening of the civil service accountability to the political level, the political steering function of the cabinet advisors grew in importance.
To examine whether the political steering function of cabinets became more important after the reform, the study analyzed the lists of cabinets’ responsibilities available online from the Prodi to the Junker Commissions. The content of the lists of responsibilities was first coded and then statistically analyzed testing for the effect of the reform on the structure of cabinets’ responsibilities.
Abstract
The study focuses on the role of policy advice brokers – political advisors – pertaining to the issue of politicization in the European Commission (EC). The study conceptualizes politicization as increased use of political advisors – known as “cabinets” in the EC context – by the Commissioners to ensure political direction over the work of the civil service.
Commissioners’ private cabinets fulfil several functions, one of which is political steering of the policy work in the departments.
The study argues that as a result of the NPM-style reform and strengthening of the civil service accountability to the political level, the political steering function of the cabinet advisors grew in importance.
To examine whether the political steering function of cabinets became more important after the reform, the study analyzed the lists of cabinets’ responsibilities available online from the Prodi to the Junker Commissions. The content of the lists of responsibilities was first coded and then statistically analyzed testing for the effect of the reform on the structure of cabinets’ responsibilities.
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