a post by Lindsay Judge for the Resolution Foundation blog
It’s here at last. Almost a year and a half after the Taylor Review was published and four consultations on, the government has finally released its plan of action to improve the quality of jobs in the UK. So is this an early Christmas present for the millions of people who work through an agency, are on a zero hour contract or find their jobs via a platform? Or simply a turkey for all of those in atypical work?
For agency workers there’s a certainly a big win: the commitment from government to repeal the ‘Swedish Derogation’, a piece of legislation that allows firms to pay agency workers who have been in post for three months-plus less than directly employed staff in the same job. From a living standards perspective that’s definitely good news, going some way to reducing the £400 a year pay penalty that agency workers experience simply because of the way they work. Moreover, the government has said it will take steps to provide agency workers with a clear statement of rights. Given we have flagged before that knowledge of holiday pay entitlements and auto-enrolment is particularly parlous, action on these fronts would be especially welcome.
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Showing posts with label agency_workers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label agency_workers. Show all posts
Friday, 4 January 2019
Friday, 24 March 2017
Clarity needed in training the ‘temps’: Agency staff’s greater risk of work-related disorders
an article by Brian Beal (affiliation not provided) published in Human Resource Management International Digest Volume 25 Issue 2 (2017)
Abstract
Purpose
Research shows that the risk of work-related disorders is higher among temporary agency workers than among other employees. The purpose of this paper is to describe the working conditions of temporary agency workers and explains which factors contribute towards work-related disorders for this group.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper is based on a survey responded to by 482 agency workers in Sweden. The dependent variable is the prevalence of work-related disorders. Independent variables include personal characteristics, job characteristics, employment characteristics and temporary agency work characteristics.
Findings
The study indicates several risk factors: holding a position as a blue-collar worker; being assigned to more physically demanding work tasks and having fewer opportunities to learn new things than client organization employees; lacking training for work tasks; and lacking clarity regarding which work tasks to do during an assignment.
Originality/value
The theoretical implications of this study are related to the dual employment–management relationship in temporary agency work where the temporary work agency and client organization follow different logics. The logic in the employment relationship is to contract temporary agency workers out to client organizations; thus, there is no time for formal training. The logic in the management relationship lies in making temporary agency workers profitable as soon as possible, encouraging shortcuts in training and instruction; thus, temporary agency workers risk being left with a lack of clarity regarding what to do and how to do it.
Abstract
Purpose
Research shows that the risk of work-related disorders is higher among temporary agency workers than among other employees. The purpose of this paper is to describe the working conditions of temporary agency workers and explains which factors contribute towards work-related disorders for this group.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper is based on a survey responded to by 482 agency workers in Sweden. The dependent variable is the prevalence of work-related disorders. Independent variables include personal characteristics, job characteristics, employment characteristics and temporary agency work characteristics.
Findings
The study indicates several risk factors: holding a position as a blue-collar worker; being assigned to more physically demanding work tasks and having fewer opportunities to learn new things than client organization employees; lacking training for work tasks; and lacking clarity regarding which work tasks to do during an assignment.
Originality/value
The theoretical implications of this study are related to the dual employment–management relationship in temporary agency work where the temporary work agency and client organization follow different logics. The logic in the employment relationship is to contract temporary agency workers out to client organizations; thus, there is no time for formal training. The logic in the management relationship lies in making temporary agency workers profitable as soon as possible, encouraging shortcuts in training and instruction; thus, temporary agency workers risk being left with a lack of clarity regarding what to do and how to do it.
Monday, 7 January 2013
The Employment of Temporary Agency Workers in the UK: For or Against the Trade Unions?
an article by René Böheim, Martina Zweimüller (Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria) published in Economica Volume 80 Issue 317 (January 2013)
Abstract
Trade unions will oppose the employment of temporary agency workers if it is a move to replace workers or to curb union power.
Alternatively, trade unions may encourage the employment of agency workers if it leads to higher wages for their members.
Using British data from 1998 and 2004, we find no evidence for a negative association between trade union activity and the hiring of agency workers. Wages are typically higher in unionised workplaces; however, the trade union premium is lower in the presence of agency workers. Our results suggest that trade unions cannot effectively oppose the hiring of agency workers.
Abstract
Trade unions will oppose the employment of temporary agency workers if it is a move to replace workers or to curb union power.
Alternatively, trade unions may encourage the employment of agency workers if it leads to higher wages for their members.
Using British data from 1998 and 2004, we find no evidence for a negative association between trade union activity and the hiring of agency workers. Wages are typically higher in unionised workplaces; however, the trade union premium is lower in the presence of agency workers. Our results suggest that trade unions cannot effectively oppose the hiring of agency workers.
Monday, 10 December 2012
Union threat and non-union employment: A natural experiment on the use of temporary employment in British firms
an article by Andrea Salvatori (University of Essex, UK and Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, Germany) published in Labour Economics Volume 19 Issue 6 (December 2012)
Abstract
This paper presents the first empirical evidence on the effect of the threat of unionisation on the use of a predominantly non-union type of employment, i.e. temporary employment. The identification strategy exploits an exogenous variation in union threat induced in the UK by new legislation enabling unions to obtain recognition even against the will of the management.
The analysis finds no evidence of an effect on the probability that a firm employs fixed-term workers, and some weak evidence of a negative effect on the probability of using agency workers.
Furthermore, estimates of the effect on the share of temporary employment are negative and statistically insignificant.
Overall, therefore, there is no support for the hypothesis that firms under the threat of unionisation are more likely to use this type of non-union employment.
Highlights
► British unions can obtain recognition against the will of the management.
► I exploit this fact to study the effect of the threat of unionisation.
► I look at its effect on the use of less-unionised temporary workers.
► Union threat does not increase the probability of firms using temporary workers.
JEL Classification: J51
IZA Discussion Paper No. 5574 (published March 2011) (PDF 36pp)
Abstract
This paper presents the first empirical evidence on the effect of the threat of unionisation on the use of a predominantly non-union type of employment, i.e. temporary employment. The identification strategy exploits an exogenous variation in union threat induced in the UK by new legislation enabling unions to obtain recognition even against the will of the management.
The analysis finds no evidence of an effect on the probability that a firm employs fixed-term workers, and some weak evidence of a negative effect on the probability of using agency workers.
Furthermore, estimates of the effect on the share of temporary employment are negative and statistically insignificant.
Overall, therefore, there is no support for the hypothesis that firms under the threat of unionisation are more likely to use this type of non-union employment.
Highlights
► British unions can obtain recognition against the will of the management.
► I exploit this fact to study the effect of the threat of unionisation.
► I look at its effect on the use of less-unionised temporary workers.
► Union threat does not increase the probability of firms using temporary workers.
JEL Classification: J51
IZA Discussion Paper No. 5574 (published March 2011) (PDF 36pp)
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