an article by Nikolay Angelov (Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy (IFAU), Uppsala, Sweden; Uppsala University, Sweden) and Marcus Eliason (Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy (IFAU), Uppsala, Sweden) published in IZA Journal of Labor Policy Volume 7 Article 12 (2018)
Abstract
In many countries, a non-negligible percentage of the working-age population has impairments that also entail reduced work capacity, and disability retirement is increasing. Despite this, studies on the effects of policies aimed at enhancing the labour market inclusion among people with disabilities, such as targeted wage subsidies, are surprisingly few.
In an attempt to fill this gap, we have studied how wage subsidies affect future labour market outcomes for jobseekers with disabilities, in terms of employment and disability retirement.
By using inverse probability weighting applied to rich Swedish register data, we contrast participants in the wage subsidy program to observably similar non-participants during a 19-year period.
We find that participation was associated with both positive and negative labour market outcomes. On the negative side, participants were less likely to have unsubsidised employment. On the positive side, leaving the labour market through the disability insurance program was somewhat less common among participants. Moreover, using a broader employment measure including subsidised jobs, the participants were found to be employed to a larger extent, which could be interpreted either as locking-in effects or as fostering labour market inclusion.
JEL Classification: C21, J14, J23
Full text (PDF 37pp)
Showing posts with label wage_subsidies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label wage_subsidies. Show all posts
Wednesday, 9 January 2019
Tuesday, 6 November 2012
Effects of Temporary In-Work Benefits for Welfare Recipients: Examination of the Australian Working Credit Programme
an article by Roger Wilkins (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, University of Melbourne) and Andrew Leigh (Parliament of Australia) published in Fiscal Studies
Volume 33 Issue 3 (September 2012)
Abstract
We investigate the impact of ‘Working Credit’, a nationally-implemented programme which created increased incentives for welfare recipients to undertake temporary work.
Highlighting the difficulties in identifying programme effects in the absence of a randomised controlled trial or a natural experiment, we produce estimates of impacts under alternative identifying assumptions and also undertake various robustness checks.
Unconditional and regression-adjusted difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the introduction of the Working Credit programme increased employment rates, earnings and exits for those on income support, but matching methods and various robustness checks provide conflicting evidence on the impact on movements from welfare to work for unemployment benefit recipients.
Moreover, estimated effects on earnings while on benefits are sensitive to identifying assumptions. Notwithstanding our inability to conclusively identify causal effects of the programme, we note that our findings are broadly consistent with the incentive effects of the programme, with recipients making use of the credits to increase earnings while on benefits, but not increasing movements off welfare.
JEL classifications: H24, J08, J22
Abstract
We investigate the impact of ‘Working Credit’, a nationally-implemented programme which created increased incentives for welfare recipients to undertake temporary work.
Highlighting the difficulties in identifying programme effects in the absence of a randomised controlled trial or a natural experiment, we produce estimates of impacts under alternative identifying assumptions and also undertake various robustness checks.
Unconditional and regression-adjusted difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the introduction of the Working Credit programme increased employment rates, earnings and exits for those on income support, but matching methods and various robustness checks provide conflicting evidence on the impact on movements from welfare to work for unemployment benefit recipients.
Moreover, estimated effects on earnings while on benefits are sensitive to identifying assumptions. Notwithstanding our inability to conclusively identify causal effects of the programme, we note that our findings are broadly consistent with the incentive effects of the programme, with recipients making use of the credits to increase earnings while on benefits, but not increasing movements off welfare.
JEL classifications: H24, J08, J22
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
