an article by Vanessa Beck (University of Leicester, UK) published in Work, Employment and Society Volume 32 Issue 1 (February 2018)
Abstract
This article discusses the issue of choice as it applies to long-term unemployed and vulnerable individuals.
It argues that the combination of poor employment opportunities, requirements, compulsions and sanctions has not merely reduced available choice for individuals with multiple barriers to re-/join the labour market but has also resulted in curtailed decision-making abilities when it comes to their pathways into employment.
The outcomes can include protective resistance as a response to the extent of regulation, which may undermine engagement in job search and related activities. Despite attempts by benevolent staff in a charity to provide support and enhance capabilities that result in the overcoming of protective resistance, they operate within a broader institutional framework of choice as set by government policy.
The end result is compulsion, not choice.
Showing posts with label sanctions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sanctions. Show all posts
Friday, 16 March 2018
Monday, 30 October 2017
Sanctions and the exit from unemployment in two different benefit schemes
an article by Henna Busk (Pellervo Economic Research PTT, Helsinki, Finland and University of Jyväskylä, Finland) published in Labour Economics Volume 42 (October 2016)
Highlights
This paper investigates the effect of benefit sanctions on the exit rate from unemployment using a unique set of rich register data on unemployed Finnish individuals.
The timing-of-events approach is applied to distinguish between the selection and causal effects of sanctioning.
The results imply that the effect of sanctions differs according to the benefits received. Sanctions encourage unemployed individuals receiving flat-rate labour market support (LMS) to find jobs, whereas unemployed individuals receiving earnings-related (UI) allowances to leave the labour force.
The encouraging effect of sanctions on active labour market policy programmes is relatively small and statistically significant only among LMS recipients.
JEL classification: C41, J64,J65
Highlights
- We examine the effect of benefit sanctions on the exit rate from unemployment using the timing-of-events approach.
- The effect of sanctions differs according to the benefits received.
- Sanctions increase the exit rate from unemployment to work among flat-rate labour market support receivers.
- Sanctions increase the exit rate from unemployment to outside the labour force among earnings-related benefit receivers.
This paper investigates the effect of benefit sanctions on the exit rate from unemployment using a unique set of rich register data on unemployed Finnish individuals.
The timing-of-events approach is applied to distinguish between the selection and causal effects of sanctioning.
The results imply that the effect of sanctions differs according to the benefits received. Sanctions encourage unemployed individuals receiving flat-rate labour market support (LMS) to find jobs, whereas unemployed individuals receiving earnings-related (UI) allowances to leave the labour force.
The encouraging effect of sanctions on active labour market policy programmes is relatively small and statistically significant only among LMS recipients.
JEL classification: C41, J64,J65
Wednesday, 19 April 2017
Sanctions and the exit from unemployment in two different benefit schemes
an article by Henna Busk (Pellervo Economic Research PTT, Helsinki, Finland; University of Jyväskylä, Finland) published in Labour Economics Volume 42 (October 2016)
Highlights
This paper investigates the effect of benefit sanctions on the exit rate from unemployment using a unique set of rich register data on unemployed Finnish individuals. The timing-of-events approach is applied to distinguish between the selection and causal effects of sanctioning.
The results imply that the effect of sanctions differs according to the benefits received. Sanctions encourage unemployed individuals receiving flat-rate labour market support (LMS) to find jobs, whereas unemployed individuals receiving earnings-related (UI) allowances to leave the labour force.
The encouraging effect of sanctions on active labour market policy programmes is relatively small and statistically significant only among LMS recipients.
JEL classification: C41, J64, J65
Highlights
- We examine the effect of benefit sanctions on the exit rate from unemployment using the timing-of-events approach.
- The effect of sanctions differs according to the benefits received.
- Sanctions increase the exit rate from unemployment to work among flat-rate labour market support receivers.
- Sanctions increase the exit rate from unemployment to outside the labour force among earnings-related benefit receivers.
This paper investigates the effect of benefit sanctions on the exit rate from unemployment using a unique set of rich register data on unemployed Finnish individuals. The timing-of-events approach is applied to distinguish between the selection and causal effects of sanctioning.
The results imply that the effect of sanctions differs according to the benefits received. Sanctions encourage unemployed individuals receiving flat-rate labour market support (LMS) to find jobs, whereas unemployed individuals receiving earnings-related (UI) allowances to leave the labour force.
The encouraging effect of sanctions on active labour market policy programmes is relatively small and statistically significant only among LMS recipients.
JEL classification: C41, J64, J65
Monday, 27 July 2015
Active labor market programs - employment gain or fiscal drain?
an article by Alessio JG Brown (IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn, Germany) and Johannes Koettl (The World Bank, Washington DC, USA) published in IZA Journal of Labor Economics Volume 4 Number 1 (2015)
Abstract
This paper provides a new perspective by classifying active labor market programs (ALMPs) depending on their objectives, relevance and cost-effectiveness during normal times, a crisis and recovery. We distinguish ALMPs providing incentives for retaining employment, incentives for creating employment, incentives for seeking and keeping a job, incentives for human capital enhancement and improved labor market matching. Reviewing evidence from the literature, we discuss especially indirect effects of various interventions and their cost-effectiveness. The paper concludes by providing a systematic overview of how, why, when and to what extent specific ALMPs are effective.
JEL codes: J08, J22, J23, J38, E24
Full text (HTML)
Abstract
This paper provides a new perspective by classifying active labor market programs (ALMPs) depending on their objectives, relevance and cost-effectiveness during normal times, a crisis and recovery. We distinguish ALMPs providing incentives for retaining employment, incentives for creating employment, incentives for seeking and keeping a job, incentives for human capital enhancement and improved labor market matching. Reviewing evidence from the literature, we discuss especially indirect effects of various interventions and their cost-effectiveness. The paper concludes by providing a systematic overview of how, why, when and to what extent specific ALMPs are effective.
JEL codes: J08, J22, J23, J38, E24
Full text (HTML)
Wednesday, 7 August 2013
A commentary on resistance to the UK’s Work Experience programme: Capitalism, exploitation and wage work
an article by Chris Grover and Linda Piggott (Lancaster University, England) published in Critical Social Policy Volume 33 Number 3 (August 2013)
Abstract
In this commentary we focus upon resistance to the UK’s Work Experience programme that aims to help the young unemployed secure paid employment. The programme hit the news headlines in February 2012 when the group, Right to Work, forced concessions from the UK’s Coalition government that removed sanctions for Work Experience conscripts who left their placement after a week.
The paper critically engages with the Right to Work’s demand for ‘real jobs’, paying at least the minimum wage, suggesting that such demands are in danger of buttressing capitalist exploitation, rather than providing an alternative to it.
The paper argues a more radical approach is required if the role of policies, such as Work Experience, in the societalisation of capitalist accumulation is to be avoided.
Abstract
In this commentary we focus upon resistance to the UK’s Work Experience programme that aims to help the young unemployed secure paid employment. The programme hit the news headlines in February 2012 when the group, Right to Work, forced concessions from the UK’s Coalition government that removed sanctions for Work Experience conscripts who left their placement after a week.
The paper critically engages with the Right to Work’s demand for ‘real jobs’, paying at least the minimum wage, suggesting that such demands are in danger of buttressing capitalist exploitation, rather than providing an alternative to it.
The paper argues a more radical approach is required if the role of policies, such as Work Experience, in the societalisation of capitalist accumulation is to be avoided.
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