Can Social Robots Qualify for Moral Consideration? Reframing the Question about Robot Rights

an article by  Herman T. Tavani (Rivier University, Nashua, USA) published in Information Volume 9 Issue 4 (2018)

Abstract

A controversial question that has been hotly debated in the emerging field of robot ethics is whether robots should be granted rights. Yet, a review of the recent literature in that field suggests that this seemingly straightforward question is far from clear and unambiguous.

For example, those who favor granting rights to robots have not always been clear as to which kinds of robots should (or should not) be eligible; nor have they been consistent with regard to which kinds of rights – civil, legal, moral, etc. – should be granted to qualifying robots.

Also, there has been considerable disagreement about which essential criterion, or cluster of criteria, a robot would need to satisfy to be eligible for rights, and there is ongoing disagreement as to whether a robot must satisfy the conditions for (moral) agency to qualify either for rights or (at least some level of) moral consideration.

One aim of this paper is to show how the current debate about whether to grant rights to robots would benefit from an analysis and clarification of some key concepts and assumptions underlying that question. My principal objective, however, is to show why we should reframe that question by asking instead whether some kinds of social robots qualify for moral consideration as moral patients.

In arguing that the answer to this question is “yes”, I draw from some insights in the writings of Hans Jonas to defend my position.

Full text (HTM)

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).

---

Is weeding defensible? Moral consideration for crabgrass

an article by John Hainze (Seattle University, WA, USA) published in Interdisciplinary Environmental Review Volume 18 Number 3/4 (2017)

Abstract

How we relate to other species undergirds our approach to sustainability.

This paper traces the development of human regard for other organisms, considering philosophical and religious perspectives in light of recent developments in biology.

Aspects of the biology of pest organisms like silverfish, dandelions, fruit flies, and crabgrass are reviewed as supporting moral considerability. It is determined that the findings of science, philosophy, and religion lead us to abandon a Cartesian conception of non-humans as machinelike other, and towards an attitude of moral consideration for other organisms.

This position requires that we adjudicate conflicts between members of different species, affirming the need to survive over lesser needs such as efficiency or aesthetics. A respectful attitude towards common living things like crabgrass can only enhance our relationship to nature in general.

Hazel’s comment
Pest organisms have a right to life? Philosophically yes but silverfish in my kitchen cupboards do not; dandelions in the rose bed need to be removed; and fruit flies are yucky. Crabgrass I had to look up (see http://www.garden-counselor-lawn-care.com/kill-crabgrass.html) but I feel murderous about the Japanese Knotweed encroaching from my neighbour’s garden.

---